






on Foreign Economic Policy began hearings on
the proposed $10-billion International Monetary
Fund (IMF) Supplementary Credit Facility-
the so-called "Witteveen Facility." TheSubcom-
mittee's concern focused on the"massive balance
of payments lending that has been done by the
commercial banks since the oil price hike"1 and
its impact on the stability of the U.s. banking
system and the international financial system as
a whole. A subcommittee staff report, prepared
in advance of the hearings, described the prob-
lem created by the mounting debt ofthe borrow-
ingcountriesas follows:
As the debt service burden balloons for
many countries toward the end ofthis dec-
ade, thepoint may come when one or sever-
al of these countries will find it more in
their interest to simply default or repudiate
their external debts rather than to have to
continue borrowing just to repay old loans.
And if this happens, a domino effect could
take place in which other debtor countries
follow suit: the banks panic and start call-
ing in their international loans; the stock
market drops precipitously; and the inter-
national capital market collapses. This
doomsday scenario may be extreme in its
pessimism, but it is being taken seriously
enough by responsible officials that a con-
certed international effort is now underway
to preventthatfirst domino from falling.2
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
grounds for this concern. Section 1compares the
conditions prevailing in world trade and finance
during the 1974-76 period, with those prevailing
during the 1970-73 period. This survey confirms
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the general impression of abrupt and large in-
creases in world payment imbalances since 1973,
rapid external-debt accumulation by non-oil de-
veloping nations, and a substantially enhanced
commercial-bank role in financing the payment
imbalances. Moreover, available projections sug-
gest that world payment imbalances will contin-
ue large in the foreseeable future and that banks
will continue to handle a substantial part of the
payments financing.
Section 2 turns to the question: Is such a sys-
tem inherently unstable, as alleged? We ap-
proach that question by examining three areas:
(a) balance-of-payments adjustments of deficit
countries, (b) the persistent OPEC surplus, and
(c) the mounting debt of developing countries.
The analysis suggests that the world economy
has been more successful in approaching interna-
tional financial stability than is generally real-
ized. Although much remains to be done, there is
little reason to be overly concerned over the fu-
ture stability of the international financial
system.
Section 3 examines two policy-related issues.
First is the prudence ofcommercial-bankfinanc-
ing ofworld payment imbalances-in particular,
the extension ofmedium- andlong-term balance-
of-payments loans for maintaining domestic con-
sumption rather than investment financing. We
find little ground for concern over such loans.
The second issue concerns the roles of the IMF
and national central banks in enhancing the sta-
bility and efficiency ofthe international financial
system with respect to commercial-bank financ-
ing of world payment deficits. Although the sys-
tem is found to be basically sound, appropriate
national and international measures should be
adopted-indeed, some already have been adopt-
ed-for improving its functioning and strength-
ening its safeguards. This and other conclusions
areset forth in a final section.I. Deficits and External Debts
Worldpaymentimbalances
The world current-account payment imbal-
anceshifted abruptly in recent years, from an an-
nual average of$20 billion in the 1970-73 period
to $87 billion in the 1974-76 period.3 (Table 1)
Incidentally, we separate "Surplus OEeD" from
"Deficit OECD" countries in this comparison, to
underscore the different balance-of-payments
performances among the OECD countries. As a
result, the total world payment imbalance (total
deficits) is much larger than when all OECD
countries areconsidered as a group.4
The countries that suffered the largest de-
clines (in absolute terms) from the recent shocks
to the world economy were not the non-oil devel-
oping nations, as is commonly assumed, but the
"Deficit OECD" countries. As agroup, the latter
countries recorded a shiftfrom acurrent-account
surplus of$3 billion per year during the 1970-73
period to an annual deficit of $29 billion during
1974-76, whereas the non-oil developing coun-
tries moved from a $15-billion average deficit to
a $37-billion average deficit over the same
period.
Internationaldebtaccumulation
Although nearly all the deficit countries bor-
rowed internationally during 1974-76, data on
external debts are available only through 1975,
and only for the 84 developing countries thatreg-
ularly report such information to the World
Bank.5 The data indicate that the accumulation
ofpublic external debt accelerated sharplyin the
1972-75 period (Table 2). Most notably, non-oil
developing countries increased their debts tofor-
eign privatecreditors at a 40-percent annual rate
in the 1972-75 period, compared with a 17-per-
cent growth rate in the 1970-72 period. Conse-
quently, such debts rose from 31 to 40 percent of
the non-oil LDC's total external public debts be-
tween the end of 1970 and the end of 1975. Ac-
cording to incomplete World Bank estimates,
external public debts of the non-oil LDC's con-
tinued to rise in 1976, but at a decelerated (23-
percent) rate, to a year-endtotalof$123 billion.6
Bank lending
The recent rapid growth ofinternational lend-
ing has been a global phenomenon, with banks of
Table 1
World Current-Account Balances,1 1970-76
(BillionsofDollars)
Annual Averages
1973 1974 1975 1976 1970-73 1974·76
(1) OPEC2 3.0 63.5 35.5 44.0 1.5 47.7
(2) Surplus OECD3 12.8 12.0 27.4 18.6 7.9 19.3
(3) Deficit OECD4 -1.3 -34.0 -20.9 -32.1 3.1 -29.0
(4) Non-oil Developing5 -15.0 -32.5 -44.0 -34.0 -15.0 -36.8
(5) Socialistand Others6 -4.0 -10.5 -17.5 -13.5 -4.0 -13.8
(6) Statistical Discrepancies' 4.5 1.5 19.5 17.0 6.5 12.5
Total Deficits -28.4 -85.5 -89.7 -85.7 -20.5 -86.9
I. Balanceon goods, services and privatetransfers.
2. Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,Saudi Arabia, U.A.E.,and Venezuela.
3. Germany, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands,Switzerland, and United States.
4. Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and theUnited Kingdom.
5. All countries thatare not included in "OPEC"or"SocialistandOthers."
6. USSR, Eastern European Countries, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malta andSouth Africa.
7. Attributed to asymmetries in national reportings of balance of payments data. For details, see Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Economic Outlook, July, 1977, Technical Annex, pp. 152-3.
Source: Based on data in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Outlook, July 1977, pp. 69, 72-
73,89.
7many nations participating (Table 3). The data
indicate that the banks' external claims in-
creased by more than 50 percent during the
1974-76 period, and more thandoubledbetween
1973 and 1976 when interba.nk credits were
excluded.
For the three groups ofpayment-deficit coun-
tries, the banking system provided about $51 bil-
lion net lending in 1976 (Table 4), but that was
offset by a reverse flow of $31 billion into the
banking system, so that the net banking capital
flow amounted to only $20 billion, or about 25
percent of their aggregate deficit in 1976 (Table
1).7 Bank netfinancing of current-account defi-
cits last year amounted to 55 percent for "Social-
ist and Others," 23 percent for "Deficit OEeD,"
andonly 14 percentfor "Non-Oil Developing."
Despite the concern over bank lending to the
non-oil LDC's, the.net banking capital flow to
these countries amounted to only $4.9 billion in
1976, or 25 percent ofthe total flow to all deficit
countries. Moreover, only Latin American non-
oil LDC's were net blink borrowers ($7.9 bil-
lion), and Mexico and Brazil accounted for al-
most that entire amount ($7.1 billion). This









External Public Debt' of84 Developing Countries
AnnualAverageIncrease
1970 1972 1975 1970-72 1972-75
(Billions ofdollars) (percent)
51.3 69.0 121.2 17.3 Th!
35.4 46.1 70.9 15.1 17.9
15.9 22.9 50.2 22.0 39.7
43.8 56.8 100.3 14.9 25.5
30.1 38.4 59.4 13.8 18.2
13.7 18.5 40.8 17.5 40.2
'Disbursed debt outstanding at endofyear.
Source: IMPSurvey, Supplementon International Lending, June 6, 1977, p. 186.
Table 3
Total External Claims ofBanksl, 1973-76
(BillionsofDollars)
1973 1974 1975 1976
TotalClaims n.a. 368 447 555 -
U.S. banks2 n.a. 185 223 286
Otherbanks n.a. 183 224 269
Claims on Non- Banks 154 215 261 326
U.S. banks2 56 83 98 124
Otherbanks 98 132 163 202
'Includes banks in the UnitedStates, Western Europe, CanadaandJapan.
2Includes branches.
Source: IMPSurvey, Supplement on International Lending, June 6, 1977, pp. 177 and 182; and Senate Subcommittee staff
report, op. cit., p. 44.
8changes in bank liabilities as well as changes in
bank claims on developing countries. The differ-
ence between the two reflects a country's net re-
coursetothe banksduringa given period.
II. Stabilityofthe PresentSystem
The prevailing concern over the stability of
the international financial system may be sum-
marized by three propositions \vhich are ana...
lyzed in this section:
1. Balance-of-payments financing by banks has
enabled the deficit countries to postpone adopt-
ing necessary but politically and socially difficult
policy measures for correcting payments deficits.
Continued reliance on foreign borrowing reflects
continued inabilityorunwillingness toadopt nec-
essary policy measures.8
2. The persistent surplus of the OPEC nations is
a "structural surplus," which is not amenable to
normal balance-of-payments adjustment poli-
cies.9 Until oil-importing nations as a group ad-
just to reduce their dependence on oil imports
and until oil-exporting countries expand their
import-absorptive capacities, oil importers will
Table 4
External Positions of Banks1Vis-a-Vis Groups ofCountries
Year-End 1975and 1976
(BillionsofDollars)
1975 1976 Change in Change in Change in
Claims Liabilities Claims Liabilities Claims Liabilities Net Position
Surplus OECD2 i 28.2 154.3 149.6 189.0 21.4 34.7 13.3
OffshoreCenters3 61.9 40.8 83.7 56.2 21.8 15.4 6.4
Oil-Exporting' 14.3 51.8 24.1 64.2 9.8 12.4 -2.6
Subtotal 204.4 246.9 257.4 309.4 53.0 62.5 -9.5
DeficitOECD5 134.6 138.6 158.5 155.2 23.9 16.6 7.3
Non-Oil Exporting 65.2 38.4 83.7 52.0 18.5 13.6 4.9
Latin America6 (43.5) (16.3) (57.4) (22.3) (13.9) (6.0) (7.9)
Middle East and Africa (6.6) (10.0) (8.8) (12.4) (2.2) (2.4) (-0.2)
Other Asia (12.9) (10.4) (14.7) (14.7) (1.8) (4.3) (-2.5)
Other Europe' (2.2) (1.7) (2.8) (2.6) (0.6) (0.9) (-0.3)
Socialist and Others8 28.2 9.6 36.6 10.6 8.4 1.0 7.4
Subtotal 228.0 186.6 278.8 217.8 50.8 31.2 19.6
Unallocated9 9.3 13.6 11.4 16.4
Total 441.7 447.1 547.6 543.6
1. Banks in the Group-of-Ten countries and Switzerland and the foreign branches of U.S. banks in the Caribbean area and the
Far East, in domestic and foreign currencies.
2. SeeTable 1, Footnote 3.
3. Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuds, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands Antilles, New Hebrides, Pana-
ma, Singapore, West Indies.
4. Includes Bahrain and Oman, which are not membersofOPEC.
5. SeeTable 1, Footnote4.
6. Includes those countries in the Caribbeanareawhich are not offshore bankingcenters.
7. Andorra, Cyprus,Gibralter, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Vatican, Yugoslavia.
8. SeeTable 1, Footnote6.
9. Includes international institutions, residuals of Western European countries and other developed countries, and statistical
discrepancies.
Source: Bank for International Settlements, AnnualReport 1976, pp. 86-87; AnnualReport 1977, pp. 112-114.
9continue to accumulate a large aggregate pay-
ment deficit to the oil-exporting nations. So long
as the oil surplus persists, there is no end in sight
to this cycle ofa few permanent financial surplus
oil producer countries and burgeoning interna-
tional indebtedness by weaker oil importing
countries.10
3. These developments have led to mounting in-
ternational debts with rising debt-service bur-
dens for debtor countries. If this situation
continues, debtor countries may start defaulting
or repudiating external debts, and this could sig-
nal the collapse of the shaky international finan-
cial system. 11
Paymentadjustments
Many observers consider persistent large pay-
ment imbalances as prima facie evidence oflack
ofadjustment by the deficit countries. The blan-
ket indictment, however, is an over-simplifica-
tion which considers only the nominal
magnitudes involved, in isolation from the major
price and outputchanges thathave taken place in
the world economy. Moreover, the aggregate fig-
ures hide a great deal of payment adjustments
that have actually taken place in recent years.
The conventional wisdom-see Proposition 1
above-has been challenged in a massive study
by the International Monetary Fund,12 the result
of which is summarized in Table 5. The study
compares IMF staff projections of 1977 current-
account balances offour groups ofcountries with
their average balances in 1967-72-"a period of
little bias in cyclical conditions"13-adjusted to
reflect changes in prices and real output. The re-
sults indicate that (a) the industrial countries
have sustained the largest current-account dete-
rioration ($32 billion) in comparison with their
1967-72 norm; (b) the deficits ofotherdeveloped
non-oil countries have doubled since 1967-72;
and (c) non-oil LDC's are the only oil-importing
group which has fully adjusted to the oil-price in-
creases and othereconomic disturbances.
The IMF study also notes that, as a result of
these changes, the oil-exporting nations have re-
placed the industrial countries as the major sur-
plus group, supplying national savings for
financing the net imports of goods and services
required by non-oil LDC's. Only the "non-oil
more-developed" countries are now incurring a
substantially greater current-account deficit
than they did in 1967-72.14 Thus, aside from
these shifts, the global structure of current-ac-
count balances has been largely restored to its
1967-72 pattern. If that earlier structure was a
stable one, there should be no cause for alarm
over the present payments structure.
Table 5
Global Current·AccountBalances:


























1. 1967-72 average rescaled to 1977 prices and real-output levels by using (a) a general index of world trade prices for rescaling
prices, and (b) average real-GNP (or GDP) growth rates ofthe respective countrygroups for adjustment for output growth.
2. OPEC countries, as listed in Table 1, Note 2, minus Ecuador andGabon, plus Oman.
3. OECD countries, as listed in Table I, Notes 3 and 4, excluding Australia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand,
Portugal, SpainandTurkey.
4. OECDcountriesexcluded in Note 3above, plus South Africa, Malta, and Yugoslavia.
5. All other IMFmember countries.
Source: IMF, AnnualReport 1977, p. 13.
10PersistentOPEC surplus
Ifthe above IMF analysis is correct, then the
persistent OPEC surplus should not be a threat
to the stability ofthe international financial sys-
tem. As stated, the OPEC countries have now
displaced the industrial countries as the surplus
group in the world economy. Ofcourse, a persis-
tent OPEC surplus implies a persistent deficit on
the part of the oil-importing nations, but that is
no more a "structural imbalance" than was the
former surplus. The latter represented national
savings that helped to finance the rest of the
world's economic-development expenditures.
Now, the OPEC countries have assumed the role
of supplying such savings-the players have
changed, butthegame is the same.
Some worry about the reliability of the new
players. What iffor political considerations, they
employ their enormous financial resources as a
weapon and threaten to withdraw funds from the
financial institutions of the major industrial na-
tions? Would thatnot unsettle the market and, in
particular, the affected institutions?15 The con-
cern perhaps stems from a faulty perception of
how banks compete for funds. A sudden with-
drawal ofany large deposit always poses a threat
toan individual bank's profit margin, as the bank
has to scurry for funds that may be more costly
than the original deposit. But such an occurrence
does not threaten the stability ofthe market as a
whole nor the viability of the bank as an institu-
tion. The withdrawn funds have to go some-
where, and can be recycled back to the original
bankifthe bankis willing to bid for them.
In addition, as Thomas Willett has pointed
out, there are strong economic incentives against
irresponsible behavior by OPEC (in fact, any) in-
vestors.16 In today's highly competitive foreign-
exchange and financial markets, large sudden
shifts offunds will tum prices andexchange rates
against the one making the transfer. Thus, the
market place exercises its own discipline against
erratic behavior on the part ofindividual partici-
pants. Indeed, to date, there has been no evidence
to suggest that OPEC investors have behaved
irresponsibly.
Mountingdebt
Concerns over the so-called "mounting debt"
problem are often expressed in terms of the
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nominal value ofthe accumulated debt, in isola-
tion from other factors in world economic
growth. Thatis hardly a meaningful way oflook-
ing at the problem. The magnitude of the prob-
lem also depends critically on price changes,
incomeandexport growth, and similar factors.
From 1970 to 1975, the nominal debtofdevel-
oping nations increased steadily by 145 percent,
while their real debt (adjusted for export-price
changes) rose by only 40 percent-and actually
declined from 1972 to 1974 as a result of steep
increases in primary-commodity prices (Chart 1,
upper panel). Various debt ratios, despite in-
creases in recent years, still remain below their
1972 peaks, and the situation is not expected to
change much in 1977 (Chart 1, lower panel).
These measures include the ratio of outstanding
debt to exports, the debt-service ratio (ratio of
interest plus amortization to exports), and the ra-
tio of interest payments to exports. Thus, after
allowing for price changes and export growth, in-
ternational indebtedness has not increased dis-
proportionatelyin recent years.
The current concern over the external-debt
problem is reminiscent of the fears expressed
over consumer-credit accumulation in this coun-
try in an earlier era. During the 1950's, the pub-
lic became alarmed by the fact that in the first
postwar decade, consumer credit had risen at a
26-percent average annual rate compared with
only a 6-percent growth rate ofpersonal income.
What would happen to the economy if the debt
burden became unbearable and debt accumula-
tion had to stop? In a classical analysis of the
subject, Alain Enthoven used a simple debt-
growth model to show the unwarranted nature of
this concern. 17 His model assumed a constant in-
come growth rate, and new borrowings as a con-
stant proportion of income. Over time, both the
debt-growth rate and the debt-income ratio
would asymptotically approach their respective
limits, which are determined by the income-
growth rate and the new borrowing/income ra-
tio. Moreover, ifthe initial stock ofdebt is small,
both thedebt-accumulation rate and the debt-in-
come ratio would rise steeply at the beginning
and then asymptotically approach their respec-
tive long-run limits. The Enthoven prediction has
been borne out by subsequent developments. The
debt-income ratio rose only from 10 percent to13 percent between 1956 and 1976, and the aver-
age annual growth rate of consumer instalment
cr~ditdropped from 22 percent in the first
postwar decade (1946-56) to 9 percent during
thedecadeended 1976. 18
Themoralof the E,nthoven model is very sim-
ple: Debtandeconomic growth are closely relat-
ed.• Since debt must be serviced out of current
income, the debt-income ratio is a key factor to
consider. In the short run, because of transitory
factors, the ratio may rise very sharplyfor a time.
But in the long run, the ratiodepends ontwo fac-
tors-therate ofgrowth ofincome, as well as the
ratio of debt accumulation to income. In other
words, a growing economy can service. a growing
volume ofdebt, and short-run fluctuations in the
debt-income ratio provide little guidance to the
analysis ofdebt-accumulation problems.
Chart 1
DEBT OUTSTANDING AND DEBT SERVICE RATIOS
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1 The debt and debt service figures relate only to medium-term and long-term external public, or publicly guaranteed
debt,asdefined in the DebtReportingStatisticsofthe IBRD.




Fourseparate issues have arisen with respect
to bank financing ofworld·payment deficits: (a)
the risks in extending medium-term (1-7year)
balanceofpayments loans when bank liabilities
are predominantly short-term;19 (b) the risks in
mat-Jng balance~of-payments loans for maintain-
ing consumption rather than for expanding in-
vestment in productive projects;20 (c) the
relationship between profit and risk in foreign
lendirig;and (d) economic efficiency in world-
wide allocation of capital through the private
marketsystem.
Balance-of-payments loans present the usual
problem of matching long-term assets against
short-term liabilities.21 In order to cope with in-
terest-rate fluctuations, banks apply floating
rates to most of their Eurocurrency medium-to-
long term loans, with theloan rate adjusted every
six months orso to reflect movements in the Lon-
don interbank offer rate on deposits (theLIBOR
rate). Thus despite being technically committed
tofairly lengthy loans, banks essentially renego-
tiate their loans on every roll-over date.22 In this
way, theyhave demonstrated theability todevel-
opsuccessful techniques for managingtheliquid-
ity problem in the areas of both domestic and
international banking.
The concern over the use of balance-of-pay-
mentloans for domesticconsumption rather than
investmentignores the fungibility ofcapital. This
means that once loan proceeds are received, the
funds can no longer be distinguished from those
obtained from other sources, and are thus com-
pletely substitutable with each other. For in-
stance, a loan purportedly for thefinancing ofan
investment project could enable the borrower to
release his own resources for other "non-produc-
tive" purposes. On theother hand, a loan purpor-
tedly for the importation of consumer goods
could free a country's domestic resources for
"productive" investments. In short, the true test
ofthe soundness of a lQan is not its stated pur-
pose, but the anticipated·income stream of the
borrower-which inthe case ofa foreign nation
isitsexpectedrateofeconomicgrowth.
On the question of profitability, banks have
achieved a considerably higher level ofprofits on
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international banking than on dOlnesticbanking
inrecent years. In 1976,international operations
accountedfor 57 percent ofCiticorp's assets but
for 72 percent ofits after-tax earnings, and for
48 percent ofChase's total assets butfor78 per-
centofitsearnings.23 However, criticshave asked
whether banks have become soattractedbythe
profitability .of international lending as to pave
imprudently incurred an unacceptable level of
country risk.24 Yet recent surveys On banks' in-
ternal.control over foreign lending-conducted
by the Federal ReserveSystem andthe lJ.S.Ex~
imbank-have yielded no evidence to. support
that conclusion,25 Moreover, gross domestic loan
charge-offs rose from 0.42 percent in 1974 to
0.94 percent in 1976, while international loan
charge-offs rose from 0.11 percent to 0.20 per-
cent over the same period.26 Thus, international
banking to date has been at least as successful as
domestic banking in balancing profitability and
risks.
A final consideration relates to the economic
function ofbank lending, in terms ofthe efficien-
cy ofallocation ofcapital on a world-wide scale.
Most analysts recognize that banks perform an
important task of international financial inter-
mediation in recycling oil-surplus funds, but few
explicitly recognize that the banking role goes
much farther than that. The extensive banking
network that has been built up during thelast 15
years is now gathering savings from all parts of
the world and redistributing them on a world-
wide basis in response to market forces. In par-
ticular, the flows offunds arenot uni-directional
from surplus countries to deficit countries, but
are rather two-wayflows with respect to each re~
gion and indeed to each country as well (Table
4). Access to the banking network offers savers
all over the world an opportunity for internation-
al portfolio diversification, so as banking capital
flows into relatively high-return countries, savers
in these countries also put funds in the banks for
risk diversification.27 Again, because of econo-
mies of scale and scope of risk diversification,
multinational banks canoperate world-wide on a
lower overall spread between deposit and lending
rates, than can local financial institutions. In ei-ther case, the development of the international
banking network means a gain in economic wel-
farefor theworld asa whole.
Role ofthe IMF
Several recent proposals have called for the
InternationalMonetary Fund to playa more ac-
tive role in helping member countries cope with
their payments financing and adjustment prob-
lems. The proposals fall into two categories: (a)
enlargement of IMF resources to provide more
effective assistance to member countries, and (b)
increasedcoordinationwith commercial banks to
reducerisksofprivatelending.28
(a) Enlargement ofIMFresources. The two
proposals ofthis type include the so-called "Wit-
teveen facility" (described below) and the au-
thorization for the IMF to borrow directly in the
private capital market.29 Both recognize the fact
that IMF resources have become woefully inad-
equateinrelationto its responsibilities as a result
ofthesubstantial growthofworld payments defi-
cits. During the 1974-76 period, IMF lending
rose to record levels but still financed only about
six percentofaggregate paymentsdeficits.so
The Witteveen Facility is designed as a Sup-
plementary Credit Facility at the IMF, consist-
ingoffunds borrowed from source countriesat 7-
percent interest and re-Ient todeficit countries at
market-related interest rates. About $10 billion
has been pledged, including $2.5 billion from
Saudi Arabia, $1.7 billion from the United
States, $1.2 billion from Germany, and $1.0 bil-
lion from Japan. The Facility is viewed as a stop-
gap until the IMF's regular quota resources are
substantially increasedinabouttwoyears' time.
Several misgivings have been raised about the
proposed Facility. Onecriticism, raised by Sena-
tor FrankChurch, concerns its size in relation to
the magnitudeofthe aggregate payment deficits.
"Theamountcontemplated-approximately$10
billion-is nowhere near the magnitude neces-
sary to cover the balance-of-payments deficits of
the oil-importing countries. Consequently, it is
anticipated that there will be future requests for
additional Congressional appropriations."31 An-
other criticism concerns the use of the Facility
"for bailing out the commercial banks or taking
over risky loans injudiciously contracted by the
banks."32 Another possibility is that the banks,
with sucha "safetynet" underthem, might lower
14
their standards for controlling risk and further
expand their foreign lending, thus aggravating
theexternal-debtproblem.33
In response, it might be noted that the Facili-
ty's purpose is not so much to permit the IMF to
engage in a larger volume of lending, as to
strengthen its hands in urging member countries
toadoptappropriatepoliciestocurepaymentim-
balances. In thewords ofFederal Reserve Chair-
man Burns: "Onereason why countries often are
unwilling to submit to conditions imposed by the
IMF is that the amount of credit available to
them-as determined by established quotas-is
in many instances smallrelative to their structur-
al paymentimbalance.34
The key words about the proposed Facility-
indeed, about the use of all IMF credits-are
"conditionality" and "payment-adjustment poli-
cies." Thus, theintentofthe Facility is neither to
"bailout banks" nor to "bail out countries," but
to offer a viable avenue-a financially sound
package-forcountries in paymentdifficulties to
adopt in order to return to health. The outcome
would be reduced payment imbalances and a
healthier world financial climate. The resultant
reduction in risk might induce banks to expand
their foreign lending beyond what they would
otherwisedo, but that does not necessarily imply
any lowering of standards of risk-assessment. If
the Facility were administered as intended,
banks could not reasonably expect to be bailed
out from loans to countries that do not accept
policy conditions attached to IMF credits. Thus,
bad loans would still be bad loans, but the Witte-
veen Facility, by encouraging debtor countries to
adopt payment-adjustment policies, would help
improve the chances of turning potentially bad
loans intogood loans.
(b) Coordination with banks. Enhanced
IMF-bank coordination could take the form of
greater consultation to prevent misunderstand-
ings, greater flows ofinformation to assist evalu-
ation of borrowers' creditworthiness, and co-
financing packages involving a blend ofIMFand
private funds. All these proposals raise funda-
mental questions about the operations of the
IMFandits relationshipwithsovereign members
and private banks. It is, therefore, not surprising
that the IMF thus far has reacted cautiously to
thevarious proposals.Difficulties could arise, for example,.over the
proper handling of information flows. There can
be. no disagreement that a larger and freer infor-
mation.flow would aid risk.assessment and thus
improve the e.fficiency of the market. Specifical-
ly, more information-and more systematic and
tirn.elr information--is needed on the magni-
tu<ies, maturity.structures, external guarantee
provisions, and types of borrowers of both the
public and private external debts of individual
borrowing countries. A multinational project is
novvunderway, under the auspices of the Bank
for Intl':rnational Settlements, to collect such in-
formation from banks of major industrial coun-
tries and make it available to banks engaged in
foreign lending.35 More difficult is the develop-
ment of thorough analytical reports concerning
not only the economic conditions in borrowing
countries, but also the willingness and ability of
their governments to carryout appropriate stabi-
lization policies. The IMF already prepares ma-
terial ofthis type, but it is generally not available
to the public because of the confidential nature
ofIMFrecommendations.
Theneed for information, however, should not
be overstated, because the market mechanism
can help a<ijust for the volume and quality ofthe
information available at any point of time. For
instance, ifa government is either unable or un-
willing to supply information which a potential
crl':ditor deems critical, this should affect the
loanrate or lending terms--or even the decision
to lend. On the other hand, if the availability of
such information in fact makes little difference
to loan terms, it may be a good indication that
theinformation is not so critical afterall.
Lastly, several leading commercial bankers
have addressed the question of co-financing
paGkages and coordination in lending policy.
John Haley ofChase Manhattan has noted that
informal consultation already exists between
banks and the IMF, and asks to what extent the
c09peration should be formalized. He argues
against formalizing the situation to the point
where the IMF would become the arbitrator of
both official and private lending.36 Gabriel
Hauge of Manufacturers Hanover points to the
complications arising from parallel-financing
plans, where the loan agreement between the
IMFand the borrowing country contains clauses
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thatllreconfidelltial between thetwo parties. He
suggests asas91ution "cross default" clausesin
paralleHoan agreements, so that default against
anyone loan would mean defaultagainstalLthe
loa~s.inthe package. Thus protected,•hankpar-
ticipants inthepackage would not need to kn9w
theterrnsofagreernent between the IMFandthe
individllalt>orr9wiIlgcountry.37
Roleof Central Banks
It! theareaofintl':rnational.banking, as in.do-
mesticbanking, a central bank's responsibility
encOrnpasses •.both a regulatory/supervisory
function and a lender-of-Iast-resort function for
supporting the liquidity of a particular institu-
tion or ofthe economy as a whole. The former is
the subjectofanother article in this issue.38 A few
comments may be added regarding the central
bank's second responsibility-the lender-of-Iast-
resort function. 39
The concern over foreign lending arises over
the tendency for banks to jump on the band-
wagon when things are going well and to stop
lending when things go sour. This tendency cre-
ates great swings in lending activities, and at
worst a general banking crisis.40 That, ofcourse,
is precisely what central banks are supposed to
forestall through their lender-of-last-resort func-
tion, by providing ample liquidity to the banking
system through liberal discount policy. The Penn
Central episode ofJune 1970 provides a vivid ex-
ample of how the default of a major borrower
can affect financial markets, and how a central
bank's decisive actions can restore liquidity and
marketconfidence.41
In the international context, cooperation
among national central banks is clearly neces-
sary in carrying out this lender-of-last-resort
role. In fact, major central banks already cooper-
atein thisfashion through their regular monthly
meetings at Basle under the auspices ofthe Bank
for International Settlement. At one such meet-
ing, theYreached an agreement concerning ways
of extending emergency credits to banks within
their individualjurisdictions and to branches and
subsidiaries of multinational banks. Under this
agreement, parent banks are expected to back up
their foreign branches and wholly-owned subsid-
iaries. Moreover, in accordance with a 1976 Fed-
eral Reserve interpretation, U.S. banks areexpe<::t~d to support mor~than their own share in
cas~of difficulty. with joint ventures-that is,
arrangements involving minority participation
wheresomemana.gementinterestexists.42
The•central·banks participating in the agree-
mentdeliberatelyJeft unclarified the exact pro-
cedures for providing temporary liquidity.
Instead, they merely statedthattheywere "satis-
fied that means are available for that purpose
and will be used ifand when necessary."43 This is
inlinewith thetraditionofnot defining and pub-
licizingspecific rules for emergency assistanceto
troubled banks, to discourage banks from relax-
ing their bankerlycaution and relying instead on
suchemergencyfacilities.
Thus, the present international financial sys-
tem is cushioned against untoward shocks, first
by banks which have access to a vast internation-
al money market with considerable depth,
breadth, and resiliency; then by central banks
acting as joint lenders oflast resort; and also by
the IMF with its active surveillance over adjust-
ment policies in borrowing countries. Interna-
tional cooperation in this fashion promotes a
basic condition ofconfidence, under which banks
can safely and efficiently perform their function
ofinternationalfinancial intermediation.
IV. Summary andConclusions
1. As a result of the post-1973 international
crises-the OPEC oil price increase plus the en-
suing world-wide inflation and recession-total
world current-account imbalances more than
quadrupled from an annual average of $20 bil-
lion in 1970-73 to $87 billion in 1974-76. Net
bank lending (changes in claims minus changes
in liabilities) financed about one-fourth of the
aggregatedeficits in 1976.
2. Considerable balance-of-payments adjust-
ments have now been made-especially by·the
majority of non-oil developing countries-given
the price changes and output growth that have
occurredsince the 1967-72 period. While contin-
uedimprovementsare needed, the payment im-
balances and growing debt are not as
unmanageable as sometimes alleged. When the
same factors are taken into account, the external
debt burden ofnon-oildeveloping countries (as a
group) does notappear to beany larger now than
in theearly 1970's.
3. The continuing OPEC surplus has re-
placed the pre-1973 current-account surplus of
the industrial nations as the principal source of
world savings for financing deficit countries' de-
velopment needs. Being riskaverters, the OPEC
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countries have chosen to place the bulk of their
surplus funds in world financial markets, includ-
ingbanks.Theyarethussubject to thesame kind
of market discipline as other investors and, in
fact, have behaved as responsible investors in
their investmentactivities.
4. In principle, there is no reason why com-
mercial banks should not extend medium- or
even long-term loans for financing payment defi-
cits, even though the loans may be intendedfor
maintaining domestic consumption·rather than
for investment financing. There is also no evi-
dencethat banks have been any more lax in con-
trollin~risks in theirforeign lending thanintheir
domestic lending. On the positive side, interna-
tionalfinancial intermediation through multina-
tioualbanks means enhanced efficiency·in
gathering and allocating capital in the world
economy.
5. Although the world financial system is ba-
sically sound, there is much that the IMF and
nationalcentral banks cando-and in fact have
done-to improve the system's functioning (e.g.
assurance oflender-of~last-resortfacilities). The
proposed Witteveen Facility is a needed step in
thisdirection.FOOTNOTES
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